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24 July 1961

SUMMARY ... of ROWNY PRELIMINARY NATO REPORT DRAFT

1. Point of Departure.


The NSC Directive on NATO, approved by the President on 21 April 1961 (copy on hand). Key quotes therefrom:

- a. First priority must be given to preparing for the more likely contingencies, i.e., those short of nuclear or massive non-nuclear attack " (p.5)
- b. "The U. S. should propose that the objective of improving NATO's non-nuclear forces should be to create a capability for halting Soviet forces now in or rapidly deployable to Central Europe for a sufficient period to allow the Soviets to appreciate the wider risks of the course on which they are embarked." (p.6)
- c. "If allied agreement to these guidelines can be secured, the NATO military commanders should be asked by the Council to design alternative programs: one corresponding to present levels of military spending, and one projecting as significant an increase as seems realistically feasible" (p.10).
- 2. Soviet Capability in Central Europe.

Too often exaggerated; "his employable strength against the Allies in Central Europe is more like 50-55 divisions." (p.6).

3. NATO Capability in Central Europe.

"There are now 22 NATO ready divisions in the Central Region, which reduce to 20 on an equivalent scale with the 50-55 he could employ against us." (p.7). "Present NATO forces could not stop such an attack by conventional weapons." (p.9). However, "the analysis shows that a force of approximately 30 M-Day divisions in the Central Region could hold off the enemy by non-nuclear means, without sacrificing major portions of territory in Western Germany, for a period of up to 30 days." (p.14).



Financial Implications.

a. "It would seem desirable to have a significant increase in MAP for non-nuclear improvements but to place main emphasis on improving U. S. forces If there is to be some increased support, it should probably go to alleviate <u>real</u> problems of the countries providing principal Central Front forces, although these are the countries generally in the best position to pay." (p.23).



7. Some Concluding Remarks.

"The program outlined above does no more than provide NATO with a capability to defend Central Europe in conventional war for an extended, but

not indeterminate, period of time." (p.27). "It must be clearly understood that tactical and strategic nuclear weapons would be used when it becomes necessary to do so to avoid being driven from the continent." (p.28)

8. Comment.

i.,